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Boulwareism and Good Faith Collective Bargain.hig
The obligation to bargain collectively in good faith is imposed
on both the employer and the representative of his employees by
the National Labor Relations Act.1 Generally, some form of ask-

I. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958) and § 8(3) of the NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 10l(b)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1958), require the employer and the labor organization respectively to bargain
collectively. To bargain collectively is defined by § S(d) of the NLRA, as amended
Ly the Labor Management Relations Act § lOl(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1958), as the duty to "meet •.. and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
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and-bid bargaining is used to satisfy this statutory obligation.2 Since
1947, however, the General Electric Company has developed and
used a bargaining technique known as Boulwareism,3 which, on its
face, seems capable of achieving the same results as the ask-and-bid
method, but in a more efficient manner. Nevertheless, the National
Labor Relations Board recently found Boulwareism to be in violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. 4
Although the facts leading to the Board decision relate specifically
to the 1960 contract negotiations between GE and the International
Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE), they are
typical of the Boulware techniques. Since initiating its plan to improve industrial relations, GE has continually employed a communications program designed to promote the company's image as a protector of employee interests.5 When formal contract negotiations
began in 1960, JUE was permitted to present its contract demands
and supporting arguments. GE discussed and criticized the union's
position, but did not indicate, either in its communication program
or at the bargaining table, the particulars of its own position, nor
did it provide certain information requested by the union. Following this initial discussion period, GE made a firm and final offer
based on extensive year-round research into all relevant considerations, including a consideration of the union's demands. 6 Since this
offer was stated to be the only one warranted by the facts, GE declared that it would not compromise its position, 7 but professed a
2. In ask-and-bid bargaining, the parties unveil their respective positions at the
outset of negotiations. Thereafter, the parties engage in an economic tug-of-war,
hoping to force concessions and to reach an agreement.
3. The term "Boulwareism" refers to General Electric's entire approach to labor
relations. Its basic premise is that scientific methods, rather than bargaining skill,
should be used for attaining settlements. See generally Northrup, The Case for
Boulwarism, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1963, p. 86. Note, "Boulwarism": Legality
and Effect, 76 HARv. L. REv. 807 (1963).
4. General Elec. Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 1964) (hereinafter
cited as principal case].
5. The communications relevant to the principal case publicized GE's philosophy
of collective bargaining, questioned the motives of James Carey, the union president
and chief negotiator in 1960, and ultimately urged the employees to indicate their
approval of the GE offer to the union representatives.
6. The offer included a 3% general wage increase effective when an agreement
was signed and another 4% increase effective April 2, 1962. Brief for Respondent,
p. 69, principal case. An almost identical offer was made by GE's competitor, Westing•
house, and accepted by the IUE. See IUE News, Oct. 24, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; Oct. 10,
1960, p. 3, col. 1.
7. According to the Boulware theory, a holding back of material for later concessions would be inconsistent with GE's policy of voluntarily accommodating the
interests of its employees. While this approach appears to be take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining, see Selekman, Cynicism and Managerial Morality, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Sept.-Oct. 1958, pp. 61, 64. GE's technique does not seem to differ materially in effect
from those situations in which parties take extreme initial positions, planning to
retreat later in what appear to be concessions or compromises. See generally Blum,
Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality? Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1961, p. 63.
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willingness to alter its bargaining offer if IUE could show a sufficient
change of circumstances or new facts to warrant an alteration in
the offer.8 The union called an unsuccessful strike,9 which failed in
part because of GE's solicitations to the local unions and to the individual employees, and ultimately GE's offer was accepted. IUE then
filed a complaint with the Board alleging that GE's bargaining constituted an unfair labor practice.10 The Trial Examiner found that
the totality of GE's conduct, which included a number of challenged
practices,11 indicated that GE was not bargaining in good faith.
Particularly, the Trial Examiner disapproved GE's final-offer bargaining table conduct. GE filed exceptions, but a majority of the
Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Report.12
Good faith collective bargaining has always been a difficult concept to define. Although the congressional discussions preceding the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act reveal disagreement
as to the meaning of the statutory requirement, 13 the early decisions
of the NLRB and the courts clearly indicated that a mere meeting
and discussion was insufficient to satisfy the statutory obligation and
that, in addition, an effort must be made actually to reach an agree8. In past contract negotiations between GE and the IUE, changes in GE's
original offer always have occurred. For example, in 1953 GE modified its offer after
General Motors acceded to union demands for a wage increase. See Northrup, supra
note 3, at 91. In 1960, twenty-three changes were alleged to have been made. Brief
for Respondent, pp. 69-72, principal case. However, the Board mentions only five
such changes. Principal case, at 1494. See note 38 infra.
9. At that time, there were apparently three major demands which prevented
agreement: (1) the discontinuance of a cost of living escalator clause spaced at intervals between wage increases at more than one year; (2) a union shop; and (3)
supplemental unemployment benefits. Brief for Respondent, p. 63 and Brief for
General Counsel, p. 229, principal case.
10. Similar charges were made in 1954 and 1958 but were dismissed by the
General Counsel. NLRB Cases Nos. 2-CA-3811 (1954) and 2-CA-8190 (1958).
11. The charges specifically cited were: (1) GE's failure to furnish certain
requested information to the Union during negotiations; (2) GE's attempts to deal
separately with locals on matters properly the subject of national negotiations with
the IUE, and its solicitations of locals to abandon or refrain from supporting the
strike; (3) GE's pre-negotiation presentation of a personal accident insurance proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; and (4) its overall approach to, and conduct of,
bargaining. Principal case at 1499.
12. Member Jenkins concurred, disagreeing with the condemnation of GE's
approach to collective bargaining. Member Leedom agreed with the concurring
opinion on this issue but dissented from the majority opinion.
13. Senator Walsh declared, "When the employees have ••. selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer
and say, 'Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees.' 'What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into ... .'' 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935). On the other
hand, Senator ,vagner thought the bill required a party to match unacceptable
proposals with counterproposals and to make every reasonable effort to reach an
agreement. Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935). See generally Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1403-09 (1958); Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty To Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065, 1084 (1941).
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ment. 14. By 1947, however, Congress had become dissatisfied with
the tendency of these tribunals to control the bargaining table conduct of the parties by examining the reasonableness of an employer's
proposal.15 Consequently, section S(d) of the NLRA was added by
the Taft-Hartley amendments to provide that the obligation to
bargain collectively requires neither agreement to a specific proposal
nor the making of a concession.16 A second amendment expressly
obliged labor unions to bargain collectively.17 Congressional debates
disclose that one motive for this latter addition was to outlaw by
statute the unions' practice of making a single take-it-or-leave-it
offer. 18 Thus, legislative history seems to indicate that Congress had
two principal objectives in imposing the duty to bargain collectively
on both the employer and the union: (I) the assurance of a joint
effort aimed at reaching agreement, including the prevention of a
closed-minded or take-it-or-leave-it attitude, and (2) the prevention
of compelling concessions or agreement.
However, since Congress did not specify what conduct of the
parties at the bargaining table would satisfy the obligation to bargain
in good faith nor what inferences should be dra,;\Til from conduct and
statements away from the bargaining table, the courts have had to
devise some enforceable standard. The basic test developed seems
to be whether a party's total conduct indicates a sincere desire to
reach agreement. 19 If that desire cannot be found, then it is presumed that the party has, in effect, rejected the whole basis of collective bargaining. The inference of bad faith may be dra,;\Til from
a party's bargaining tactics or from his bargaining position,20 but
this determination often is a difficult one. Although external behavior without specific declarations may or may not indicate a party's
state of mind, it is clear nonetheless that good faith theoretically
requires more than the offer of a proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it
14. See, e.g., Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939), enforced, lIO F.2d
632 (4th Cir. 1940); Globe Cotton Mills, 6 N.L.R.B. 461 (1938); Atlas Mills, Inc., 3
N.L.R.B. IO (1937).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21 (1947).
16. Labor Management Relations Act § I0l(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1958). See generally H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 15, at 19-21; H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
Pt. I at 24 (1947).
17. Labor Management Relations Act § IOl(b)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1958).
18. See 93 CONG. REc. 4135 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ellender); id. at 4363 (remarks
of Senator Pepper). See generally Note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 502 (1958).
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed &: Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &: Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1943); Duro Fittings Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 377 (1958). See generally Cox, supra
note 13, at 1416-21.
20. See Duvin, The Duty To Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
248, 256-65 (196~).
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basis.21 However, it is also established law that at some point in
traditional ask-and-bid bargaining negotiations can be forced to an
impasse.22 Indications of bad faith have included the outright rejection of a union's proposals,23 intentional stalling of agreement by
postponement,24 or sending a representative to the negotiations who
is unauthorized to bind the employer.25 And bad faith has been
found when a party refused to produce reasonable proof to substantiate a claim of economic inability to raise wages,26 where a party
insisted upon patently unreasonable terms,27 and where a party
forced negotiations to an impasse upon a proposal concerning a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.28 On the other hand, bargaining
table threats of economic harassment were held not to be inconsistent
with good faith bargaining by the United States Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union. 29
In certain cases, the Board and the courts have disregarded the
good faith criterion and have found a per se refusal to bargain,30
especially in matters involving conduct required by the NLRA itself.
Thus, it is unfair labor practice per se to refuse to bargain on mandatory subjects,31 to change employment benefits unilaterally while
negotiating with the union prior to an impasse,32 to refuse to execute
a written contract incorporating any agreement already reached, 33
21. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' lnt'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960);
NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939).
22. See NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir. 1954); Texas
Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1954); Philip Carey Mfg. Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1104 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1369 (1961).
Cf. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
23. E.g., NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953), enforcing
as modified 100 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1952); E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 8: Co., 115 N.L.R.B.
84 (1956).
24. E.g., NLRB v. Reed 8: Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953).
25. E.g., NLRB v. Hibbard, 273 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1960); Wheatland Elcc. Co-op.
v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1953).
26. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. U9 (1956).
27. E.g., NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.
1963) (employer presented only two counterproposals, would not agree to put into
writing provisions he was already observing, and demanded unilateral control of
all conditions of employment in a management prerogatives clause); Majure v.
NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952) (employer insisted on a management prerogatives clause, reserving to himself unilateral control of all conditions of employment).
28. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
29. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
30. The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), gave full
recognition to the per se doctrine.
31. Ibid. Mandatory subjects are those concerning "wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment," using the terminology which appears in § 8(d) of
the NLRA. See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Fleming,
The Obligation To Bargain in Good Faith, 16 Sw. L.J. 43, 45.53 (1962).
32. E.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); NLRB v. Shannon,
208 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1953).
33. E.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. Wate, Inc., 310
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and to refuse to comply with reasonable requests to furnish information. 34 Since these items are generally procedural in nature, the per se
determination has been justified on the basis that compliance will
facilitate the reaching of an effective bargaining agreement.85
Applying these somewhat ambiguous standards to the principal
case, it appears that GE's refusal to furnish certain requested information alone might have been the basis for finding a per se refusal
to bargain. Clearly, however, the NLRB grounded its holding on
the breach by GE of some type of good faith test, 36 specifically condemning GE's firm offer because it was similar to take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining.87 But, since GE expressly stated an intention to accept,
and indeed did accept, some changes,38 Boulwareism does not seem
to involve an absolute take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Furthermore,
there was substantial evidence to indicate that the offer itself was
reasonable in all respects and that the company did desire to reach
an agreement with the union.39 Thus, GE seems to have met the
general test for bargaining in good faith. Moreover, conduct indicating a purpose to insist on the acceptance of an offer without substantial alteration has been held not to constitute a violation of the
duty to bargain if a sound business purpose underlies the employer's
position,40 and arguably such a business purpose existed in the principal case. However, in cases upholding such steadfast bargaining
the absence of other conduct indicating bad faith has been critical
to the court's approval, and in cases where conduct indicating a possible lack of good faith has existed, intransigence has been an important factor in the court's finding of a departure from the good faith
F.2d 700 (6th Cir 1962), enforcing 132 N.L.R.B. 1338 (1961); Standard Oil Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 690 (1962).
34. See NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 834 (1963); Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592 (1949).
35. See generally Duvin, supra note 20, at 268-69.
36. See principal case, passim.
37. Id. at 1499.
38. The five changes recognized by the Board were: first, an option of a 3%
increase in wages in 1962, coupled with a fourth week of vacation for employees of
twenty-five years service plus an eighth paid holiday for all employees, replacing
the 4% wage increase contained in the original offer; second, the effective date of
the 1960 wage increase was moved up to Monday of the week an agreement was
signed; and the other three changes concerned the Company's employees' insurance
and pension plans. Principal case at 1494.
39. GE met with the Union forty-five times between July 19 and October 22,
which was the date of the end of the strike. It conferred on all required subjects of
bargaining, did not take unilateral action or insist to a point of impasse on any
non-mandatory bargaining provisions. Its offer was not patently unreasonable, and
the General Counsel conceded GE's desire to reach an agreement with the union.
Brief for Respondent, p. 5, principal case.
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1954), denying
enforcement of 102 N.L.R.B. 1569 (1953); Texas Foundries Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d
791 (5th Cir. 1954), denying enforcement of 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952); McCulloch
Corp., 132 N,L.R,.B, 201 (1961},
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standard.n It would seem, then, that the Tesult in the principal case
could have been justified on the Board's determination that there was
evidence of other conduct which indicated a lack of good faith. 42
One consequence of accepting this analysis would be that GE or
another company could eliminate the condemned conduct from its
bargaining procedure, and the remaining characteristics of Boulwareism would then be available as a good faith technique. However, the majority opinion of the Board seems to transcend even the
flexible standard of the traditional good faith requirement and
to condemn Boulwareism totally.
The Board first condemned Boulwareism because of its tendency
to disparage the union. The National Labor Relations Act gives
employees the right to choose their own bargaining representative,43
and the employer is required to recognize a certified union. 44 GE
apparently attempted to bypass IUE and to bargain directly with
local unions when IUE was, in fact, the proper bargaining representative.45 Furthermore, one of the declared purposes of the NLRA
was to restore equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees,46 and this required employees to focus concerted power
through their chosen union organization and to use that organization
as a vital and necessary instrument to force concessions from the
employer. However, Boulwareism was calculated to suggest to employees that the union can procure no benefits for them that the
company has not chosen to grant voluntarily. Although a history of
tough bargaining alone might produce a similar impression, GE's
technique of freezing its position through policy declarations means
that even if it desires to compromise in a given situation, it cannot
do so without risking loss of face. 47 Thus, Boulwareism seems to
relegate the employees' proper bargaining representative to a mere
advisory position.
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v.
Denton, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, 136970 (1961) (dictum).
42. See evidence outlined note 11 supra. The Board's reliance upon GE's communication program as evidence of bad faith should be carefully limited. Section 8(c)
of the NLRA provides that communication cannot be evidence of an unfair labor
practice unless it contains a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 61 Stat.
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958). Cases involving the interrelationship of §§ 8(a)(5)
and 8(c) have upheld employer communications similar to those employed in the
principal case. See, e.g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196 (1962).
43. NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
44. See NLRA § 9(a), 49 StaL 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) and NLRA § 8(a)(5), 49
Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
45. See principal case, at 1497.
46. NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
47. At one point in the negotiations, GE admitted that "everything we think we
should do is in the proposal and we told our employees that, and we would look
ridiculous if we changed now." Principal case at 1500.

1480

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 6!

The Board also indicated that General Electric's technique violated the whole spirit of collective bargaining.48 In incorporating
the terms "meet" and "confer" into the collective bargaining process through section S(d), Congress arguably contemplated an atmosphere of reasoned negotiation that would result in mutual agreement,49 whereas GE's approach requires that, if the company has
done its research properly, there will be no need to change its offer,
barring unforeseen circumstances.50 Although the substantive content of an agreement reached through Boulware techniques may be
indistinguishable from one reached through a more or less intensive
period of give-and-take discussion, there is no guarantee that this
will be the result. If this difference is important, then it may also
explain in part the Board's desire to force the resumption of traditional ask-and-bid bargaining.
Although Boulwareism does seem to conflict with the traditional
notions of collective bargaining under the statute, the Board should
be criticized for failing clearly to indicate the reasons, apart from
tradition, why it should not be recognized as an effective means of
satisfying the obligation to bargain collectively. Since section S(d)
expressly does not compel concessions, it seems unwise to discourage
reasonable firm and final offers which are based on a full consideration of all relevant facts from both the business and employee viewpoints. Furthermore, when the employees themselves favor the company offer, 51 it seems purposeless to require traditional ask-and-bid
bargaining on the theory that employee interests will thereby receive
greater protection. It is true that permitting a Boulware type offer
might necessitate a determination of the reasonableness of the terms
of the offer, an examination which Congress expressly tried to eliminate by providing that concessions need not be made by either
party.52 Nevertheless, it would seem that the Board and the courts
are presently considering the reasonableness of the terms of an offer
in cases where negotiations have been forced to the point of impasse
and particularly where the parties have otherwise acted in good
faith. 53 As a means of trying to encourage industrial stability through
the recognition of bargaining maturity, perhaps a test more consonant with all relevant considerations would require one party to
give the other a reasonable length of time to examine a contemplated
offer in whole or in part, to express its views, and to suggest methods
48. Ibid.
49. See generally Duvin, supra note 20, at 265.
50. See principal case at 1500.
51. In the principal case, the Schenectady local, the largest in the IUE, although
striking for a short period, returned to work before the end of the 1960 walkout. De•
certification petitions were filed by union employees in Bucyrus, Ohio, and Burlington,
Vermont, and threatened elsewhere. See Northrup, supra note 3, at 92.
52. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1947).
53. See, e.g., cases cited note 22 supra.
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of compromise before the offeror is permitted to declare a final Boulware type offer.
Since there was sufficient evidence in the principal case to enable
the NLRB to conclude that the company's conduct did not coincide
with traditional definitions of good faith bargaining between an employer and a union, it would seem that the Board has prematurely,
and perhaps unfairly, condemned Boulwareism itself. Boulwareism,
as an abstract bargaining concept, appears to have a potential for
increasing the chances of early agreement and thus decreasing industrial strife. For this reason alone, it merits a more thorough consideration. If that part of GE's conduct which indicated a lack of good
faith were eliminated and the disparagement of union power were reduced, it would appear that the other Boulware techniques, such as
the reasonable firm and final offer and the major portion of the
communications campaign, could lawfully be retained. The principal case will be examined by another court,54 and perhaps by the
Supreme Court, and a more specific indication of which characteristics of the Boulware technique violate the National Labor Relations
Act is required. The Board's seemingly innate adverse reaction should
be insufficient to support the total condemnation of Boulwareism as
an unfair labor practice.
54. When the Board issued its order against General Electric, the company filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the union
filed a similar petition with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. When
it was discovered that these review petitions had been filed at approximately the same
time, the NLRB broke the impasse by seeking enforcement of its order with the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the territory in which the alleged unfair labor
practices occurred. The other two courts have apparently agreed to surrender their
jurisdiction to the Second Circuit. CCH LAB. L. REPORTS, p. I (Feb. 18, 1965).

